International Economic Policy in the Wake of the Asian Crisis by Barry Eichengreen
A:\HONOLULU  March 29, 2000 (10:40AM)
International Economic Policy in the




The Asian crisis was the third financial crisis of the 1990s. Even more than its
predecessors it raised questions about the international community’s approach to crisis
prevention and crisis management. It led reservations to be voiced, and not only in Asia,
about full and unfettered international capital mobility and about the policy priorities of the
International Monetary Fund.
                                                
1Prepared for the East-West Center/Korean Development Institute Conference on the
Korean Crisis, Honolulu, August 10, 1998. This paper builds on observations from a year
spent at the IMF, which coincided with the Asian crisis. I owe a special debt of thanks to my
colleagues there for stimulating input. It goes without saying that they do not necessarily
agree with the views expressed.
This paper discusses the policy challenges posed by the Asian crisis. It starts in
Section 1 by reconsidering the controversy over capital mobility. Even before the crisis
struck, the IMF was on record as favoring the liberalization of capital flows and had proposed
amending its Articles of Agreement to make the promotion of capital account liberalization a
purpose of the Fund and to give it jurisdiction over restrictions on capital movements. In the
wake of a crisis characterized by volatile financial flows and contagious currency crises,
capital mobility is increasingly seen as a mixed blessing. There is a feeling, especially in
Asia, that amending the Articles giving the Fund jurisdiction over capital account restrictions
would be a bridge too far. The first part of the paper therefore seeks to reconcile the
fundamental case for international capital mobility with Asia’s less-than-heartening recent
experience.- 2 -
Section 2 draws lessons for country policy. It focuses on the implications for three
issues at the heart of the Asian crisis: how to enhance the stability of  banking systems, the
connections between financial regulation and exchange rate policy, and the efficacy of capital
controls.
Section 3 turns to the IMF. Here too the questions are well known. Have Fund
programs been too restrictive for countries whose problems reflect flaws in their domestic
financial systems rather than excessively expansionary monetary and fiscal policies? Should
the Fund modify its approach to the liberalization of capital flows? Should it limit itself to the
traditional areas of monetary and fiscal policy, or does it need delve more deeply into
financial regulation, competition policy, and corporate governance?
1. The Cautious Case for Capital Mobility
In the wake of turbulence like that which afflicted the emerging markets starting in
1997, it is easy to lose sight of the fundamental case for international capital mobility. This
section first reviews that case before considering complications that render capital mobility a
two-edged sword.
The Fundamental Case for Capital Mobility
A long list of theoretical analyses has established the conditions under which
international capital mobility can raise welfare in the borrowing and lending countries. Flows
from capital-abundant to capital-scarce countries raise world welfare on the assumption that
the marginal product of capital is higher in the lending than the borrowing country. Free- 3 -
capital movements thus permit a more efficient global allocation of savings and direct
resources toward their most productive uses, promoting growth and enhancing welfare.
Capital mobility also creates opportunities for portfolio diversification and risk
sharing. Individuals, and for that matter countries, can borrow when incomes are low and
repay when they are high, smoothing the time profile of consumption.  By holding claims on
countries other than the one in which they reside, households and firms can diversify away
many of the risks associated with disturbances that impinge on their home country alone.
Companies can protect themselves against cost and productivity disturbances by investing in
branch plants in several countries across which such shocks are imperfectly correlated.
Capital mobility can thereby provide investors the ability to achieve higher risk-adjusted rates
of return.
The empirical literature has established that countries which have liberalized their
financial markets tend to grow faster than countries which have not. King and Levine
(1993a,b) analyze a cross section of countries, establishing that financial depth, as proxied by
the liquid liabilities of the financial system relative to GDP, is a significant predictor of the
rate of economic growth. Time-series studies (e.g. Neusser and Kugler 1996) confirm that
causality appears to run from financial-sector development to economic growth rather than
the other way around. While the bulk of this literature focuses on domestic financial
liberalization rather than freedom of international capital flows, there is reason to think that
the two go together. The freer are individuals and intermediaries to engage in domestic
financial transactions, the easier they will find it to evade restrictions on their international- 4 -
financial transactions, and the more costly the authorities will find the operation of capital
controls.
Given these presumptions, the evidence on the effects of capital mobility is
surprisingly weak. Cohen (1994) finds that foreign finance has a significant impact on growth
by raising the level of  investment and as a channel for knowledge spillovers but that neither
effect is large.  Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) relate the presence or absence of
controls to the rate of per capita GDP growth in a sample of 20 industrial countries but find
only a small and statistically insignificant effect. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) extend the
sample to 61 industrial and developing countries and distinguish restrictions on payments for
capital transactions, multiple currency practices, and restrictions on payments for current
transactions (which are often used to evade restrictions on capital transactions). Again, they
find no robust correlation between controls and growth. Rodrik (1998) reports comparable
results for a larger sample of developing countries.  Using a different estimation strategy,
Bordo and Eichengreen (1997) also find little evidence of an effect for the industrial
countries. For developing countries, however, they find some evidence that restrictions on
external transactions depress growth when they take the form of relatively distortionary
current account restrictions and multiple currency practices, although the effect is small. On
balance, then, there is at least some sign that controls have an adverse effect on growth when
they are most distortionary and when they are imposed by low income countries that stand to
benefit the most from access to international financial markets.  But that evidence is far from
overwhelming.  As the above authors make eminently clear, it is open to competing
interpretations.- 5 -
The Risks of Capital Mobility
Why might this evidence be so weak? The obvious explanation is that capital mobility
has risks as well as returns and that whether the costs or benefits dominate depends on how
effectively the risks are managed.  Exposure to capital flows reduces the autonomy for
monetary policy, forcing the authorities to choose between targeting the exchange rate and
targeting the interest rate, and constrains fiscal policy by making it difficult for a country to
unilaterally raise taxes on financial incomes, transactions and wealth. Flows from developed
to developing countries can fluctuate for reasons beyond the control of the recipients, for
example because a decline in interest rates in the major money centers ignites a search for
yield, or because financial problems in neighboring countries precipitate a contagious loss of
confidence in emerging markets. Large inflows can aggravate macroeconomic imbalances,
fuel overlending by loosely regulated financial institutions, and encourage inflation,
construction booms, and economic overheating generally unless the authorities take prompt
corrective action.
2 Large outflows can create intense pressure for exchange rate depreciation,
impose reserve losses on governments and central banks seeking to defend the currency’s
external value, and undermine the solvency of banks and firms with large unhedged foreign
exposures. All of these problems can disrupt economic growth.
                                                
2  In the form of, inter alia, a sharp contractionary shift in the stance of fiscal policy.
Other instruments the authorities might use to moderate the impact of capital inflows include
sterilized intervention, contractionary open market operations, higher reserve requirements on- 6 -
                                                                                                                                                      
banks, and actively managing public-sector deposits.- 7 -
While much of this is conventional wisdom, the Asian crisis has placed these dangers
in relief. It has underscored that capital flows occur in surges. Studies had already established
the responsiveness of emerging-market capital flows to the level of interest rates in the
money centers.
3 In the most recent episode this phenomenon took the form of the “carry
trade.”  Investors were encouraged to establish and maintain positions in (but not limited to)
fixed-income markets by the low level of interest rates in leading financial centers. They
funded themselves in mature markets and invested in Asia, the ample credit of which they
made use reflecting the low level of interest rates in Japan and the United States. Using low-
cost funding to buy high-yielding East Asian fixed-income securities was attractive so long as
exchange rates did not move. In the case of Thailand, in 18 of the 20 quarters through 1997-II
this carry trade was profitable, the pegged exchange rate ruling out exchange-rate surprises.
The exchange rate peg is critical to this story, comprising as it did a key link in the
chain of implicit guarantees. The government purported to guarantee that the exchange rate
would not be devalued, relieving foreign investors of exchange risk. It purported to guarantee
all bank deposits, relieving foreigners lending short to the financial system of all credit risk. 
                                                
3Lower interest rates both prompted a search for yield by investors and increased the
debt-servicing capacity of already indebted borrowers.  On the role of global interest rates in
the resumption of lending to emerging markets in the early 1990s, see Calvo, Leiderman and
Reinhart (1993) and Eichengreen and Fishlow (1996).- 8 -
As emphasized by Dooley (1996), McKinnon and Pill (1996) and Krugman (1997), these
distortions created a one-way bet encouraging excessive capital inflows. 
But, as in earlier episodes, the situation was not sustainable. The carry trade was
susceptible to being disrupted by a modest move toward more restrictive global credit
conditions. In the spring of 1997 this took the form of interest rate increases in the United
Kingdom and Germany. Japanese long rates moved up from 2 to 2½ percent when the
outlook for the Japanese economy appeared to brighten, and short rates firmed with talk that
the Bank of Japan might raise rates by the end of the year.
4 Together with the appreciation of
the dollar against the yen, which undermined the competitiveness of Asian countries that
placed heavy weights on the dollar in their basket pegs, a slowdown in the global electronics
industry, and mounting problems in some of the recipient countries, most notably Thailand,
these developments curtailed the carry trade. The ability of the Thai government to honor its
exchange rate commitment was cast into doubt.  International banks and other investors
closed out their long positions in Asian fixed-income securities and began shorting the baht
as Thailand’s vulnerability became apparent. What had previously been an excessive capital
inflow became an unmanageable capital outflow.
                                                
4See Aliber (1998).- 9 -
 The Asian crisis provided impressive evidence of the potential for volatility in
foreign exchange markets. While some observers suggested that certain Asian currencies,
most notably the baht, were 5 or 10 per cent overvalued prior to the crisis, no one anticipated
that the baht or the Indonesian rupiah might lose 40, or 50 or even (in the latter case) 80 per
cent of its value.
5 No one foresaw that the volume of foreign exchange transactions would
implode so dramatically. The reasons for these sharp exchange rate movements and for the
dramatic reversal in the direction of capital flows remain unclear. Some accounts invoke
extrapolative expectations and herding on the part of incompletely informed investors,
describing the meltdown in terms analogous to a self-fulfilling bank run.
6 Others point to
positive-feedback effects of the scramble for cover by firms and corporates with unhedged
foreign currency exposures. Drawing on the older literature on contractionary devaluation
(e.g. Krugman and Taylor 1978), others have suggested that depreciation, by weakening the
financial condition of banks and firms, engendered expectations of further depreciation. Still
others emphasize the authorities’ ill-advised intervention strategy, through which they blew
away most of their reserves, leaving them with few resources for intervening to limit the
depreciation of the rate. Finally, some critics point to the authorities’ failure to substitute
                                                
5For retrospective evidence, see Chinn (1998).
6See Radelet and Sachs (1998).- 10 -
another transparent and credible monetary policy strategy for their discredited exchange rate
peg and to follow through with financial- and corporate-sector reform.
Another striking aspect of the Asian crisis was the virulence of the contagion. Studies
had already documented the existence of contagion in foreign exchange markets -- of the
tendency for a crisis in one country to raise the probability of a crisis in a neighboring country
even after controlling for the latter’s economic and financial fundamentals.
7 But Asian
experience underscored the force with which contagion could spread. It suggested that
contagion tended to operate most powerfully within the region where the instability
originated.
8 And it revealed that the economies most vulnerable to infection were not those
which traded with the afflicted country or competed with it in common export markets but
rather those with superficially similar macroeconomic and financial characteristics.
What are the implications for capital account liberalization? None of the preceding
undermines the fundamental case for liberalizing international capital flows. The analogy
with the case for liberalizing international trade retains its validity. That said, the volatility of
capital movements, reflecting information asymmetries that provide a rationale for herding in
financial markets, creates a case for limiting cross-border financial flows, especially short-
term flows, as a form of insurance against adverse outcomes. Similarly, the presence of other
distortions, such as implicit government guarantees for well-connected domestic banks which
the latter pass on to their foreign depositors, can result in excessive inflows. In response, a
                                                
7See Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1997a, b).
8Although it also established that it need not be limited to that one area.- 11 -
capital import tax can be an optimal second-best form of intervention to be maintained until
the distortion in question has been removed and first-best policies can be put in place. 
These are rationales for Chilean-style deposit schemes, which require investors
bringing funds into the country to make a 12-month non-interest-bearing deposit in the
amount of 30 per cent of their investment. This does not mean backing away from capital
account convertibility, for while convertibility means the removal of burdensome
administrative restrictions on international borrowing and lending, it need not inhibit the use
tax and tax-like instruments to offset other distortions which encourage excessive short-term
borrowing and lending. But it does suggest that any transition to capital account convertibility
should only be undertaken in a prudent, cautious, and measured way.
2.  Lessons for Country Policy
This section uses the preceding analysis as background for discussing the challenges
facing national policymakers following the Asian crisis. It focuses on the linkages between
exchange rate policy and prudential regulation, options for enhancing the stability of banking
systems, and strategies for the progressive opening of capital accounts.
Linking Financial Regulation and Exchange Rate Policy
A number of arguments have been advanced for why countries should harmonize
financial regulation with exchange rate policy. Most of these suggest that countries wishing
to limit exchange rate flexibility should maintain stricter prudential standards for their
financial systems. Central banks and governments have less capacity to conduct lender-of-- 12 -
last-resort operations when they are operating a currency peg.
9 In the limit, a currency-board
peg establishes a rigid link between the supply of base money and the stock of international
reserves. While Bagehot’s rule for a central bank facing a bank run is to lend freely at a
penalty rate, a government operating a currency board may have little capacity to do so.
10 
                                                
9See e.g. Sachs (1994).
10To be sure, governments can take steps to relax this constraint, at least to an extent.
Thus, Argentina while operating a currency board has negotiated commercial lines of credit
with a syndicate of international banks to be drawn on precisely in periods when the
authorities need additional resources to bank last-resort lending. Similarly, Mexico has
negotiated a smaller credit line. But the general point, that lender-of-last-resort capacity is
likely to be more limited where exchange rates are rigidly pegged, remains.- 13 -
It follows that such countries may want to limit the need for last-resort lending by
holding their banks to higher prudential standards.  They may wish to mandate higher
reserve, capital and liquidity requirements despite the negative implications of those
measures for the competitiveness of their banking systems.
11 Argentina is a case in point.
Following the Tequila shock of 1994-5, it adopted a 15 per cent across-the-board liquidity
requirement for all deposits of less than 90 days. It adopted risk-adjusted capital asset
requirements nearly half again as high as the Basle standards. The government announced a
program of limited, privately-financed deposit insurance to reduce the risk of bank runs due
to the contagious loss of depositor confidence. While both self-financed deposit insurance
and exceptional liquidity and capital requirements reduce the international competitiveness of
the banking system, it can be argued that this was a necessary price to pay for a country
whose entire economic policy strategy was organized around a rigid currency-board peg.
12
                                                
11Taken to an extreme, as some authors do, this is the argument that countries with
currency boards should also operate systems of narrow banking. I return below to the
advantages and disadvantages of narrow banking.
12Allowing an increase in bank concentration is another means to this end. (A further
prudential effect of bank concentration operates through the induced increase in the franchise
value of bank licences.) This approach has been employed by Hong Kong. See Freris (1991).- 14 -
Argentina’s experience is not alone in suggesting that the Basle capital standards may
not provide an adequate basis for managing banking risk in emerging markets. But the
present discussion suggests that the relevant distinction is not so much between mature and
emerging markets as between countries operating more and less flexible exchange rate
regimes.
Another rationale for linking prudential regulation with the exchange rate regime is
suggested by Akerlof and Romer (1995). When financial institutions receive explicit or
implicit government guarantees, there may be a temptation for owners to strip the
intermediary of its net worth, leaving recapitalization to the authorities. Akerlof and Romer
argue that opportunities for doing so will be enhanced by the maintenance of a temporarily
pegged exchange rate. If the exchange rate is expected to depreciate by 10 per cent over the
holding period, the domestic-currency interest rate will exceed the interest rate on otherwise
comparable foreign-currency loans by 10 per cent.
13 It may then be possible for owners to
borrow in foreign currency, to extend domestic-currency loans to residents, and to pay out the
high accounting income to shareholders. When devaluation eventually occurs, the domestic
borrower will be left unable to repay his loans, threatening the viability of the financial
intermediary, but by then the high accounting earnings will have been paid out, and it will be
left for the authorities to recapitalize the failed financial institution.
14 In the words of the
                                                
13Even if there is a bankruptcy premium on foreign loans to the domestic bank, that
premium will be less than actuarially fair when lenders have confidence that the government
will assume responsibility for the liabilities of the bank.
14As noted, this is an equilibrium in the sense that the failed financial institution’s
foreign debt is repaid, encouraging foreign investors to lend again.- 15 -
authors, “The preceding outline suggests how fixed exchange rates and misleading
accounting can encourage a pattern of bankruptcy for profit that ultimately results in an
economy-wide financial crisis.”
15
                                                
15Akerlof and Romer (1995), p.19.- 16 -
Here again, the obvious solution is stricter prudential regulation. Banks and firms
operating in an environment of pegged exchange rates where the scope for such activity is
great should be made to match the currency denomination of their assets and liabilities,
required to use economically meaningful accounting practices that set aside reserves for
contingent liabilities, and forced to satisfy higher capital requirements so that owners are
deterred by significant losses in the event of bankruptcy. Where such measures are difficult to
implement, greater exchange rate flexibility is to be preferred.
16
This then raises the issue of coordinating the move to greater exchange rate flexibility
with efforts to strengthen the financial system.
17 If bank balance sheets are weak and financial
institutions have large open foreign positions, they may be unable to manage a sudden
increase in exchange rate variability. A sudden depreciation may provoke bank insolvencies,
undermine confidence in the economy, and lead to further currency depreciation and further
bank insolvencies in a vicious spiral. This creates an argument for strengthening the position
                                                
16Another option, not incompatible with the alternatives, is to remove the implicit
government guarantee so that foreign lenders build an appropriate bankruptcy premium into
their loans. See McKinnon and Pill (1996), Dooley (1996),  and Krugman (1997).  This,
obviously, is easier said than done.
17Known in the literature as the problem of exit strategies -- see Eichengreen and
Masson (1998).- 17 -
of the banks -- for cleaning out nonperforming loans, raising capital and liquidity
requirements, and tightening restrictions on open positions -- before exiting the peg.
In theory, there should be an interior solution to this optimization problem, as for any
well-behaved economic problem. The marginal benefits of additional bank restructuring
presumably decline over time.  The marginal costs of delaying the exit presumably rise. The
optimal time to exit is when the marginal benefits of waiting are about to exceed the costs. 
This time, while positive, is presumably finite. But the situation is more complicated when
these two relationships are neither independent nor well-behaved.  Say that the longer the
authorities wait to relax the currency peg, the less their incentive to sink the costs of cleaning
up the banking system.  Or say that the longer the authorities defend the exchange rate with a
policy of high interest rates, the weaker the banking system becomes, and the more costly and
time consuming it becomes to clean it up. Delay can then be a recipe for disaster.
Financial Rescues and the Problem of Banks
The Mexican crisis had already led observers to predict that the dominant source of
financial crises in emerging markets was likely to be weak banking systems and weak bank
supervision.
18  In Thailand, the failure of the finance companies appears to have been the
trigger that set off the run on the currency. In other Asian countries, the timing of events was
the reverse -- currency depreciation undermined the balance-sheet positions of banks and
bank customers with unhedged foreign exposures, helping to precipitate a run on the banking
                                                
18See for example Goldstein (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996).- 18 -
system, which then further weakened the position of the banks -- but the weakness of
financial systems and financial supervision was again key.
Lax supervision was a key factor in the surge of capital flows into Asia in the years
leading up to the crisis. The carry trade that was the vehicle for this flow of funds was
sustained into 1996 and 1997 by the diversification of European banks into middle-income
Asia. European banks saw their business depressed by the slow growth of a European
economy weighed down by fiscal consolidation and their margins squeezed by the
intensification of cross-border competition. European banks enjoying implicit guarantees,
including state savings banks in Germany and institutions like Credit Lyonnais in France,
moved most aggressively into high risk, high yielding Asian loans. They were late to the
party: even while American banks were winding down their exposure to Asia, European
banks were continuing to build up their’s. Japanese banks, for their part, invested in high-
yielding Asian securities as a way of gambling for redemption.
Much of this was bank-to-bank lending. Asian banks enjoying implicit guarantees of
their own had an incentive to fund themselves abroad and invest in high-yielding securities.
Hence the stories of Korean banks obtaining funds from Japanese banks and investing in
Indonesian corporate paper, Russian GKOs, and Brazilian Brady bonds. And Asian
governments, having long regarded their financial systems as central to their national
economic development strategies, were loath to let their banks fail. Aware of the tendency for
governments in this position to guarantee the liabilities of distressed domestic financial
institutions, international investors were not deterred from lending by the riskiness of the
banks’ assets.- 19 -
Once again, the solution to this problem is stricter prudential supervision and
regulation of banking systems in both the lending and borrowing countries.
19 Supervisors
should monitor the adequacy of internal controls, internal and external audits, loan and
investment policies, and risk-management techniques. They should verify that banks have
adequate information systems in place to identify loan and investment concentrations in their
portfolios.  They should make particular efforts to prevent abuses associated with connected
lending and require banks to lend on an arm’s-length basis. They should require realistic
valuation of bank assets while imposing appropriate capital adequacy, liquidity, credit
diversification, foreign exchange exposure, and nonbank activity requirements and limits.
20
Bank supervisors should be granted political independence, financial autonomy, legal
immunity, and the right to conduct on-site inspections.  Banks for their part should be
required to provide adequate and accurate information to their supervisors, who should have
the power to impose remedial and punitive measures, including revocation of the license to
operate, in the event of noncompliance. Other desirable elements include limiting public
sector distortions (by limiting public sector guarantees, restricting deposit insurance to small
deposits, and establishing a credible exit policy) and raising the quality of public disclosure
as a way of strengthening market discipline.
All this is easier said than done. Political pressure for regulatory forbearance is
intense.  The knowledge required to assess bank balance sheets is in short supply,  nowhere
                                                
19The list that follows is essentially drawn from the Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision (Basle Core Principles).
20The list here draws on Goldstein (1997) and Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren (1998).- 20 -
more so in emerging markets. Efforts to loosen this bottleneck through technical assistance
by the World Bank and banking-system surveillance by the IMF run up against personnel and
expertise constraints of their own. The problem grows more intense as banks branch into new
lines of business and with the proliferation of exotic, thinly-traded derivative financial
instruments.
The alternative is to rely on simple rules, limiting, inter alia, banks’ foreign-currency
exposures as a way of containing risk. Unfortunately, simple rules can have complex
consequences, including unintended ones. Restricting the open foreign exchange positions of
banks, for example, may simply cause the latter to pass on that exposure to their domestic
customers (who are even less able to handle it) in the form of foreign-currency-denominated
loans.
Similarly, capital requirements higher than the Basle standards are a deterrent to
excessive risk taking only if bank capital is ultimately written down. Political pressure may
lead the authorities to recapitalize an otherwise insolvent bank on concessionary terms or to
establish a special facility that takes nonperforming loans off the banks’ books in return for
government bonds in excess of those loans’ marked-to-market value. If so, capital
requirements will have little deterrent effect.
These dilemmas have motivated the search for additional options for regulating and
restructuring the banking sector. One such option is narrow banking, under which banks, or at
least insured banks, are permitted to invest their liquid liabilities only in liquid assets.
21 
Eligible assets could be limited to deposits with other banks and to interest-bearing assets
                                                
21See Litan (1987) and Burnham (1990).- 21 -
like short-term government securities, the market in which is deep and broad.  Since narrow
banks are still exposed to interest-rate risk and small depositors will still have difficulty in
evaluating banks’ portfolios, there will remain a case for deposit insurance.  But narrow
banks would have little scope for taking on additional risk.
22
                                                
22They would be competitive with other financial institutions in the same sense as
money-market mutual funds. And were there any doubt about this, giving them exclusive
access to the payments system operated by the central bank would give them a special
advantage in terms of convenience in carrying out transactions for their customers.- 22 -
The demand for other banking services would not disappear, of course.  Firms with a
demand for external finance would supply increasing amounts of commercial paper and junk
bonds, the demand for which would be provided by the expansion of mutual funds.
23  But
only relatively credit worthy borrowers are able to issue the kind of publicly-traded securities
attractive to mutual-fund-like vehicles.
24 The demand for commercial, industrial, real estate
and consumer loans by less credit-worthy borrowers would therefore shift to finance
companies and finance-company-like organizations which were not offered deposit
insurance.
25  The latter would then have an incentive to offer deposit-like liabilities.
26 Many
of the risks presently associated with banks would simply shift to non-bank intermediaries,
which might themselves have a tendency to affiliate with narrow banks (presumably through
holding companies). The question would then become whether the authorities’ ex ante
commitment not to apply too-big-to-fail arguments to these entities would be politically
sustainable ex post. Insofar as financial distress in these entities gave rise to bank-like
externality problems, this might not be the case. The hope of narrow-banking proponents is
that the authorities could head off threats to systemic stability by undertaking lender-of-last-
resort operations (following sound central bank practice, lending only at penalty rates against
acceptable collateral), but not necessarily compensating investors for their losses, who would
                                                
23As well as insurance companies, pension funds, and hedge funds.
24For a theoretical explanation, see Diamond (1991).
25Finance companies typically fund themselves with capital (significantly more capital
than commercial banks) and long-term debt.
26Unless this was prohibited and prevented in practice by detailed and rigorously
enforced regulatory restrictions.- 23 -
then have an incentive to exert stronger market discipline against unsound lending practices.
But in a sense, the proponents of narrow banking are simply assuming a convenient answer to
the fundamental question; were it really so simple for governments to limit depositor bailouts
in this way, they could simply limit the provision of those bailouts to existing financial
institutions, obviating the need to create narrow banks.
A second option is to internationalize the banking system. A banking system with an
internationally diversified asset base is less likely be destabilized by a domestic economic
crisis. Domestic branches of foreign banks effectively possess their own private lenders of
last resort in the form of the foreign head office. And the institution as a whole can count on
last-resort lending by the central bank of the country in which the home office resides, where
that country is likely to be a more stable mature market. Finally, where competent
management is in short supply, allowing entry by foreign banks can be a means of importing
expertise.
27  Parent banks with hard-earned reputations for financial probity have an incentive
to apply to their foreign branches state-of-the-art internal controls and accounting standards.
                                                
27As Gavin and Hausmann (1997, p.135) put it, “Such banks bring with them
accounting practices, disclosure standards and risk management practices shaped by the
requirements of the world’s most demanding supervisors and private investors.”- 24 -
All this provides an argument for internationalizing banking systems.
28 To be sure,
the elimination of statutory barriers to the establishment of foreign branches and subsidiaries
will not produce a single global banking system overnight. Domestic banks have an
advantage when seeking to defend their market share as a result of having invested in
proprietary sources of information. And however invigorating the chill winds of international
competition, suddenly exposing domestic banking to foreign entry can be a sharp shock to
previously sheltered financial institutions. In the absence of an orderly exit policy it may
encourage gambling for redemption and other perverse short-run responses. This argument
for phasing in the internationalization of banking suggests that this solution will take time to
implement.
A final option is to place taxes or quantitative limits on the short-term foreign-
currency borrowing of banks. Banks, it has already been argued, are a special source of
vulnerability to the stability of the financial system. Knowing that the importance the
authorities attach to the maintenance of confidence will ultimately induce them to make good
on the banks’ liabilities, international investors attracted by high domestic interest rates will
be inclined to provide short-term foreign-currency funding in the expectation of being able to
get their money out. At the same time, allowing the banks to borrow short term in foreign
currency heightens the risk of crisis, since the domestic authorities cannot print the foreign
exchange needed by a lender of last resort seeking to make good on these liabilities and can
                                                
28As argued strongly by Meltzer (1998).- 25 -
only pay off the banks’ creditors by putting the domestic economy through a wrenching
internal and external adjustment.
These are arguments for limiting banks’ short-term foreign-currency borrowing. Each
bank could be restricted to borrowing no more than a certain percentage of its liabilities.
Alternatively, the total short-term foreign-currency borrowing of the banks could be limited
to a certain percentage of total banking-sector liabilities, and banks could auction
entitlements to borrow among themselves.
Limiting the ability of banks to borrow abroad would, however, simply encourage
nonbanks to do the borrowing for them. Domestic corporates could borrow offshore in
foreign currency and deposit the proceeds with domestic banks which, their access to external
funding restricted, would offer relatively attractive deposit rates; the banks would then onlend
the proceeds to other customers. If corporates hedged their exposure by making foreign-
currency denominated deposits the banks would end up with the same short-term foreign
currency exposure as when there were no limits on their ability to fund themselves abroad.
Assuming no change in the pressure on the authorities to provide the banks with guarantees,
foreigners would have the same incentive to freely supply short-term foreign-currency
funding, since there would still be little question about their ability to get their money back.- 26 -
The vulnerabilities to which the financial system was subject would remain essentially
unchanged.
29
                                                
29If, on the other hand, corporates made domestic-currency deposits, they would
assume the foreign-exchange exposure and be subject to similar insolvency risk from
exchange rate changes as the banks in the no-restriction scenario. It seems likely that they
authorities that had previously felt impelled to extend guarantees to the banks would now
extend similar support to nonbanks, having induced the latter to take on financial-
intermediation responsibilities.- 27 -
The logical result of starting down this road is therefore a tax or tax equivalent on all
foreign capital inflows, not merely on  inflows into the banking system. If it was intended to
target short-term capital inflows, it could be structured as a holding period tax, like the
Chilean measure which requires all nonequity foreign investment to be accompanied by a one
year, noninterest-bearing deposit with the central bank (whose tax equivalent therefore
declines with the duration of the investment).
30 This raises the issue of the efficacy of capital
controls more generally, to which we now turn.
The Efficacy of Capital Controls
A stylized fact from the literature on capital controls is that controls on inflows are
likely to be more effective than controls on outflows. When investors anticipate a significant
fall in the foreign exchange value of the currency, they have a strong incentive to convert
their holdings into foreign exchange. For investors who sell the currency short, a 10 per cent
devaluation with 50 per cent probability over the next five days translates into an expected
return well into the triple digits. This creates a very strong incentive to find ways of
circumventing controls on outflows. While controls can slow down the rate of outflow and
                                                
30Trade credits are also subject to the 30 per cent deposit. When implemented in 1991,
the deposit requirement was only 20 per cent and its term varied by type of credit; it was
raised to 30 per cent and made uniform in May 1992.- 28 -
give the authorities a little additional breathing space to arrange a more orderly exchange rate
change, their effects are likely to be only marginal.
31
                                                
31See Mathieson and Rojas-Suárez (1993) for a review of these issues.- 29 -
Controls on inflows, and short-term inflows in particular, are a different story. Chile’s
controls on inflows, already alluded to above, are a widely-cited model.
32  Given the fixed
term of the non-remunerated deposit required of foreign investors, the effective rate of
taxation declines with the duration of the investment, providing a disinducement for short-
term lending.
33 Thus, investors attracted by high domestic interest rates but anticipating to
partake of them only for a short period may be particularly deterred. This approach has the
further advantage that it gets around the problem that controls targeted at certain categories of
capital inflows are subject to evasion by relabelling.
What is the evidence on the effects? In two years starting 1995, when Chile’s deposit
requirements were tightened, the share of short term loans in capital flows to Chile declined
from nearly 25 per cent to just 10 per cent.  The question, of course, is whether the deposit
requirement was mainly responsible for this shift, for other factors also plausibly encouraged
a lengthening of the maturity of inflows into Chile, including enterprise privatization, which
                                                
32They are also worth focusing on because, compared to other national cases, they
have been intensively studied.
33Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1996b) estimate that the effective tax equivalent on a six
month loan has fluctuated from 1.3 to 4.5 per cent (as a function of the level of interest rates).- 30 -
created new opportunities for DFI, and the country’s improving investment climate.
Similarly, the structure of the nonfinancial sector could be  responsible for the composition of
the inflow insofar as not just Chile but also other heavily-natural-resource-abundant
economies such as Colombia and Peru were recipients of relatively large volumes of DFI.
34
                                                
34There are also reports of locally-based foreign companies finding ways to evade the
tax, through for example the use of transfer pricing and other financial devices to avoid
having to book a foreign loan.
Chumacero et al. (1996) use regression analysis to confirm that at least some of the
decline in the share of short-term capital in total inflows into Chile has been due to the
deposit scheme. Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1996) similarly conclude that the scheme has
succeeded in shifting the composition of flows without significantly altering their volume.
Cowan and       de Gregorio (1997) find that the Chilean policy succeeded in driving a wedge
between domestic and foreign interest rates.  Edwards (1998), using a different approach,
finds some evidence of a greater degree of persistence in interest differentials (between Chile
and abroad) in the period of nonremunerated deposits compared to the preceding years,
suggesting that Chilean controls did provide at least limited insulation from international
flows.- 31 -
While other national experiences have not been analyzed as systematically, the
available evidence is nonetheless striking. Thailand and South Korea freed foreign investors
to lend short-term to the financial sector while continuing to restrict longer-term flows into
domestic bond and equity markets and (in the latter case) to limit direct foreign investment.
Again, these measures appear to have influenced the composition of  inflows in what, in
retrospect, appears to be a counterproductive manner. Korea placed a ceiling on medium and
long-term borrowing from international financial markets by commercial banks, encouraging
domestic intermediaries to borrow short. Foreign portfolio lending to nonbank residents was
subject to prior official approval, which apparently discouraged the practice.   Foreign
ownership of listed companies was limited to 20 per cent of their capital, and foreigners were
allowed to purchase only 30 per cent of convertible bonds issued by small and medium size
companies. There is reason to think that these measures played a role in shortening the
maturity structure of foreign loans and channeling them through the banking system.
Thailand established the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), under which Thai
banks were allowed to accept deposits or borrow in foreign currencies from abroad and lend
in Thailand.
35 To encourage the practice, BIBF banks were granted a reduction in corporate
taxes from 30 to 10 per cent, along with other incentives. Again it would appear that policy
played a role in the predominance of relatively short-term bank-intermediated inflows.
All these experiences suggest, then, that the way the capital account is controlled can
have a significant effect on the composition of capital inflows.
                                                
35In 1995 the BIBF was supplemented by the Provincial International Banking Facility
(PIBF), established under the same conditions as the BIBF but with the possibility of lending
domestically in baht.- 32 -
3. Implications for the International Monetary Fund
Never has the IMF been so at the center of controversy as in the wake of the Asian
crisis. It has been accused of moving too quickly and too slowly, too aggressively and too
cautiously, of prescribing the wrong medicine and of prescribing an overdose of the right
medicine. If one thing can be said in its defense, it is that not all these criticisms can be
correct simultaneously!
Much of this ink has been spilled over what are ultimately subsidiary issues, such as
whether the Fund’s programs for the crisis countries were too tight. There will always be
quibbling over the details of the institution’s monetary and fiscal advice, but at the end of the
day these are not the fundamental issues.
36 The fundamental issues are rather the appropriate
scope of responsibilities for the IMF and how it should carry out its functions.
One view, associated with Feldstein (1998), is that the IMF should focus on helping
countries finance and adjust to temporary balance-of-payments problems and concentrate its
advice on the monetary and fiscal policies that are the immediate determinants of the external
                                                
36The Fund, it was argued, perversely asked Asian countries maintain high interest
rates in disregard of recessionary pressures. It asked them to tighten fiscal policy despite the
fact that, unlike typical IMF program countries, they had not entered their crises with
significant budget deficits. The argument for lower interest rates is wishful thinking.
Governments had to convince the markets of their commitment to restoring currency and
price stability, and a sharp hike in interest rates was the only signaling device available.
Higher interest rates of course made life difficult for domestic banks and corporates, but
lower interest rates would have implied a lower exchange rate, and given the fact that the
currency in many of these countries had already lost 50, 60, 70 and even 80 per cent of its
value, this would have presented even greater difficulties for corporates and banks with
domestic-currency-denominated assets and foreign-currency-denominated liabilities. Those
who argue for lower interest rates to reflate the economy are therefore implicitly arguing for a
debt default or moratorium to make those lower interest rates feasible.- 33 -
accounts. The Fund has erred, in this view, by straying into financial regulation, auditing and
accounting, corporate governance, corruption, and competition policy. What business is it of
the IMF, the argument runs, to tell Indonesia to put its national car program on hold or
dismantle its clove monopoly? 
The editors of the Wall Street Journal (1998) have laid out the same argument but
drawn different conclusions. The IMF, they argue, should focus on payments problems that
threaten the stability of exchange rates. It should do so by acting as a true lender of last resort.
This means preventing financial panics by lending freely at a penalty rate to anyone who
offers good collateral but otherwise leaving domestic economic arrangements to the countries
concerned.
37
                                                
37A particularly clear statement of this view is Meltzer (1998).
These recommendations that the IMF return to its original mission fail to take into
account the changes in the international environment that have occurred over the 50 years
since the Articles of Agreement were signed. To be sure, the Fund’s role should still be to
facilitate balance-of-payments adjustment and to provide financial assistance for countries
with payments problems. But its techniques for discharging that role must be adapted to
changed circumstances.  Before its members had moved significantly in the direction of
capital account convertibility, restoring external balance meant focusing on the monetary and
fiscal policies that had an immediate impact on the current account of the balance of
payments.  But as capital accounts have opened, stabilizing the balance of payments has also- 34 -
come to mean stabilizing the capital account. And now that domestic and international
financial transactions are seamlessly linked, it is impossible to “fix” the capital account
without “fixing” the domestic financial system. If the Asian crisis has shown one thing, it is
that an injection of liquidity designed to finance a payments deficit will simply leak back out
through the capital account if it is not accompanied by measures to stabilize and restore
confidence in the domestic banking system, and that the standard adjustment measures are
likely to have perverse, even deflationary effects if not buttressed by policies to stabilize an
unstable financial system. This is not to deny that financial stability still requires sound
monetary and fiscal policies and a suitable exchange rate policy. But Thailand aside,
monetary and fiscal imbalances and misaligned currencies were hardly at the root of the
Asian crisis. What that crisis has taught us is that financial stability also requires sound bank
supervision, effective financial market regulation, transparent accounting and auditing
practices, effective corporate governance, and efficient corporate insolvency and
reorganization procedures.
A similar objection applies to the argument that the IMF should act as a true lender of
last resort but not otherwise intrude into domestic economic arrangements. How can the Fund
be asked to act as a lender of last resort without possessing some oversight of domestic
banking systems?  How can it be asked to provide liquidity against good collateral if it has no
basis on which to value the collateral it is offered?
This leads to the more difficult question of how the Fund should ensure that countries
properly surveil and regulate their financial systems, employ adequate accounting and
auditing procedures, adopt equitable and transparent bankruptcy codes, and develop efficient- 35 -
modes of corporate governance. These are complex issues; it is not clear that there exists a
consensus among experts on best practice in these areas. Given how economic, social and
political circumstances differ across countries, there should be a strong presumption that the
same arrangements are not suitable for all of them.  Nor does the IMF possess the expertise
and personnel to give each country detailed advice in each of these areas, even were this
viewed as desirable.
The alternative is to prod the public and private sectors into identifying international
standards for best practice. National practices may differ, but all national arrangements
should meet minimal standards. All countries must have adequate bank supervision and
regulation. All must have adequate accounting and auditing standards. All must have
transparent and efficient national insolvency codes.
This is a prime area for public-private sector collaboration. In the case of accounting,
for example, there already exists an International Accounting Standards Committee
consisting of representatives of the accounting profession from 91 countries, which
promulgates international accounting standards. There exists an International Federation of
Accountants, with parallel membership, which has gone some way toward formulating
international auditing standards. In the area of financial regulation there is the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which serves as a forum for securities
regulators and has established a series of working groups to coordinate regulatory initiatives.
Thus, there already exist private-sector bodies and international committees of regulators
positioned to develop standards. And insofar as other international agencies are already
engaged in standards-related work in areas such as bank supervision (the BIS), corporate- 36 -
governance (the OECD), and bankruptcy codes (the UN), this is also a promising area for
collaboration between the IMF and other multilaterals.
One could contemplate a sequence of increasingly ambitious steps toward creating a
more active role for the IMF in this area. Least ambitious would be for the Fund to observe
the activities of these groups. Somewhat more ambitious would be for it to seek status as an
ex officio member of these committees, to certify the standards they identify as measures of
international best practice, and to recommend that its member countries commit to meeting
them. More ambitious still would be for it to actively encourage countries to apprise the
markets of their compliance. Each self-organizing committee could be encouraged to
establish an electronic bulletin board where such information could be centralized.
Hyperlinks could be provided to the Fund’s electronic bulletin board. The Fund could
monitor countries’ compliance with those standards, for example in conjunction with Article
IV surveillance.
A more active role for the IMF in the promulgation of standards would be a departure
from past practice. But it is the only alternative to inaction if one believes that the Fund does
not possess the resources to develop standards in these areas itself and that it is desirable to
instead take advantage of the resources of the private sector. Public-private sector
collaboration is certain to be complicated, but the only alternative -- inaction -- is not a viable
option. The response to those who say that financial supervision, auditing and accounting
standards, insolvency and reorganization procedures, and corporate governance are mere
window dressing is that adequate institutional arrangements in these areas are essential to
financial stability in our modern world. If the Asian crisis has taught us one thing, it is that- 37 -
countries cannot restore exchange-rate and balance-of-payments stability without rectifying
deficiencies in the organization of their domestic financial systems. And if it is necessary to
proceed, there is no alternative to proceeding by way of public-private sector collaboration.
Note also that IMF involvement in this area is not unprecedented. In the wake of the
Mexican crisis, the Fund established a Special Data Dissemination Standard which, as its
name implies, is an international standard for dissemination of macroeconomic and financial
information. A recent IMF staff paper, Toward a Framework for Financial Stability
(Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren 1998), can be thought of as contributing to the creation of an
international standard for bank supervision. Recent work by the Fund on a code for fiscal
transparency can be thought of as an international standard.
These are issues of crisis prevention; a more difficult area is the management of crises
when they occur.  In the wake of the Asian crisis, concerns have been voiced that official
monies have been used to bail out private creditors, shielding them from the consequences of
imprudent lending decisions and aggravating problems of moral hazard.
38 While the Korean
crisis demonstrates that steps can be taken to “bail in” the private sector, it is important to be
clear that this is a difficult and, in some sense, intractable problem. When creditors feel an
urge to “rush for the exits,” arm twisting by the international policy community can have only
                                                
38In fact, only creditors with short-term claims on financial institutions and sovereigns
have been protected; others have sustained large losses in the secondary market value of their
claims.- 38 -
limited effect. Creditor banks as a group may be better off if they all roll over their exposure,
but each individual bank may still prefer to get out. It may take the expectation of an
imminent moratorium, or even the fact of one, to get them to acknowledge and act in their
collective interest.
That said, it is possible to suggest several steps to facilitate private-sector burden
sharing. First, it is essential to recognize, as suggested in Section 1 above, that short-term
claims pose a special problem, both because they are so liquid, making it especially easy for
those extending them to scramble for the exits, and because the stability of the financial
institutions to which such claims are often extended are so central to financial stability. The
liquidity and indispensability of their funds thus make it hard to impose a fair share of the
adjustment burden on such creditors. And this in turn provides an argument for discouraging
excessive reliance on such claims. This is an argument for the more widespread use of
measures like those employed by Chile, whose government, while applying a tax to all capital
inflows, structures it so that it falls most heavily on short-term inflows. 
Second, countries could be encouraged to arrange stand-by lines of credit from
commercial banks, similar to those arranged by Argentina. In return for a commitment fee,
banks would stand ready to make funds available at short notice, providing a form of market-
based insurance against the adverse effects of liquidity crises. Where these credit lines had
been negotiated in advance, the contribution of the commercial banks to the burden of
financing the crisis would be triggered automatically. To be sure, such credit lines are
expensive, and not all countries will be able to secure them. But recent experience in Mexico- 39 -
and elsewhere suggests that a significant number of emerging-market countries might pursue
this route.
39 
                                                
39There is also the question of whether such credit lines would in fact augment the net
resources available to the country in crisis. The skeptical counterargument is that only banks
already in the position of extending trade credits to the country would be prepared to extend
stand-by credit lines, since they could hedge their additional exposure when those stand-by
lines were called upon by curtailing their provision of trade credits, resulting in no additional
net resources for the country. But if one believes that banks extending trade credits will tend
withdraw them anyway in a crisis in order to limit their exposure, then this argument has no
force: stand-by credit lines would increase the resources available to the country relative to
this baseline. Only if one believes that banks asked to provide stand-by credits in a crisis
would then hedge by withdrawing trade credits that they were otherwise willing to provide
(even in a crisis) does the objection hold water.
Third, the Fund could initiate more regular meetings with market participants as a
way of regularizing discussions designed to encourage burden sharing. A limited approach
would consist of an increase in the frequency of informal briefings provided by mission
leaders and management. The scope of such briefings could be expanded from journalists to
encompass selected representatives of the financial community.- 40 -
Limiting briefings to selected market participants would not be even handed,
however. A more ambitious approach would be for the Fund to seek to establish a partnership
with the private sector. It might establish regular contacts between staff and a newly-
established creditor council -- “the Washington Club” -- as suggested previously by
Eichengreen and Portes (1996). That council could be a purely voluntary arrangement with
no legal standing. But it could still provide an important forum for representative groups of
creditors to receive briefings on developments and prospects, to convey concerns to the Fund
(and the official sector generally), and to exchange information regarding lending decisions.
40
More ambitiously, the group could also be assembled on an ad hoc basis and used as a
channel for explaining Fund arrangements and as a vehicle for obtaining financing
assurances. It might be used as a forum for creditors and debtors to renegotiate debts,
including international bonds. Clearly, there are controversial issues here, including the
composition of such a council, which would have to be fluid to reflect the changing structure
of debt markets and debt contracts. But if one is serious about encouraging private-sector
burden sharing, this alternative should be explored.
                                                
40The Fund’s relations with the creditor council could be analogous to the informal
semi-annual briefing provided to the Berne Union.
Notwithstanding these efforts to strengthen the Fund’s catalytic role and to encourage
creditor forbearance, there are likely to be cases where countries lose access to international
capital markets. To date, the Fund has been reluctant to contemplate standstills, moratoria- 41 -
and default for fear that they are prohibitively difficult to clear away and that they have
uncertain implications for contagion and for the stability of the international financial system.
To provide a realistic alternative to large-scale official financing, it is therefore necessary to
take steps to facilitate the smoother removal of moratoria when they occur.
Some of the relevant steps were suggested by the G-10 in its report, Resolving
Sovereign Liquidity Crises (Group of Ten, 1996). Deputies recommended making it easier to
undertake negotiations by altering the provisions of loan contracts to include majority voting,
sharing, and non-acceleration provisions. But according to their report, new provisions are to
be introduced into debt instruments through a "market-led process."  Governments are to
trumpet the virtues of new clauses but to otherwise take no action.  They are to hope that the
markets will see the light. 
But if changes in contracts were so easily adopted, the markets would have done so
already. That no real progress has occurred in the intervening three years suggests that there
are significant obstacles to market-driven reform. If only some sovereign borrowers include
qualified-majority-voting clauses in their loan agreements, for example, creditors may
suspect that those debtors regard it as likely that they will have to restructure in the not-too-
distant future.  The qualified-majority-voting clause will be regarded as a negative signal, that
the borrower is less than fully committed to servicing his loan, much like a bride-groom’s
request for a prenuptial agreement.. 
The G-10 report, perhaps in a desire to look market friendly, said little about this
dilemma. At one point it acknowledged the first-mover problem and suggested that official
support for contractual innovation should be provided "as appropriate" but failed to elaborate.- 42 -
A more pro-active approach would be for the IMF to urge the adoption of majority-
representation and sharing clauses by all its members. Implementing this recommendation
would involve the IMF in recommending that members require that all international bonds
admitted to domestic markets (including under Rule 144A) after a specified date include such
provisions. To be sure, this is no panacea. Private placements might not be affected, and
existing loan agreements might have to be grandfathered in. But slow progress is better than
no progress.
Other steps to facilitate the resolution of debt crises, and to make alternatives to
bailouts palatable, have been considered by the IMF’s Executive Board. These include
another recommendation of the G-10 report, namely, lending into arrears to provide working
capital to countries undertaking good-faith negotiations and to drive recalcitrant creditors to
the bargaining table, and amending Article VIII 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement to
empower the Fund to effectively impose a standstill to shield such debtors (and Fund
resources) from disruptive legal action. While having gone some way in the years since the
Mexican crisis toward accepting the policy of lending into arrears, selectively and on a case-
by-case basis, the Fund’s Executive Directors remain reluctant to make this official policy.
They also remain reluctant to recommend amending Article VIII 2(b) to give the Fund
the power to sanction a country’s decision to suspend debt service payments and effectively
shelter it from legal action. Giving the international community, and the IMF in particular,
the power to impose a creditor standstill may be one step too far, in the prevailing view,
toward an international bankruptcy procedure. While doing so would protect the debtor
against a destructive creditor grab race, it could dangerously undermine creditor rights. A- 43 -
U.S. court using Chapter 9 or Chapter 11 of the U.S. code to shield the debtor’s assets against
attachment by its creditors can protect creditors’ rights by using its judicial oversight to
ensure that management does not strip the firm’s assets. The ability of the IMF and the
international community to reach into the domestic affairs of countries being (rightly)
limited, the use of Article VIII 2(b) to shield debtors from legal action would not be
accompanied by analogous measures to protect creditors.
4. Conclusion
The 1997-8 crisis has been first and foremost a crisis for the countries engulfed by
financial instability, but it has also been a crisis for the international system. An adequate
response therefore requires action at both the national and  international levels. I have
emphasized the need for better coordination of prudential regulation of the financial system
with exchange rate policy, the benefits for macroeconomic and financial stability of
encouraging the internationalization of domestic banking systems, the advantages of
Argentinian- and Mexican-style commercial credit lines as a second line of defence against
financial market shocks and a way of automatically “bailing in” the private sector, and the
desirability for many emerging markets of taxes on capital inflows -- on short-term capital
inflows in particular -- as a form of prudential regulation.
At the international level, I have argued the need to strengthen institutional
arrangements in areas such as financial regulation, accounting and auditing, bankruptcy and
insolvency, and corporate governance, and that the only realistic and effective approach to
this problem is likely to be public-private sector collaboration in the design, dissemination- 44 -
and application of international standards for acceptable practice. I have also argued the case
for a more forceful approach by the IMF and G-10 countries to the problem of modifying the
provisions of loan contracts to permit private-sector burden sharing and orderly restructuring
of nonperforming debts. This and other steps, such as more systematic utilization by the Fund
of its option of lending into arrears, is necessary to create a third alternative to the untenable
situation where the only two choices for the international community in response to a crisis
are to extend a bailout or walk away.
Others will wish to add to this reform agenda. Some will remind readers of the
importance of uncontroversial but fundamental propositions such as the importance of better
information, better bank regulation, and strengthened multilateral surveillance. Still others
will advance more radical and controversial proposals -- renewed calls for a Tobin tax and an
international bankruptcy court, for example -- with less chance of implementation. But in the
view of this author, the points just enumerated should be at the center of an effective reform
strategy.- 45 -
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